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This article evaluates the implementation and the effectiveness of US 
productivity policy in Italy at the beginning of the 1950's. After having 
reconstructed the factors motivating the American initative - with reference 
to Charles Maier's theses - the concrete articulation of the policy will be 
analysed, in the context of the Marshall Plan, e.g. the technical aid 
programs and the 14 "tools" for productivity.
The effectiveness of these programs varied from country to country and 
prompted adaptations and reactions on a national basis, which have only now 
begun to be the object of historical research. This article examines, in the 
case of Italy, the reactions of the government and the major social forces 
(organizations of entrepreneurs, trade unions, and technicians) to the 
productivity policy promoted by the ECA. From this analysis the partial 
nature of the Italian interpretation of the American program appears evi­
dent, as well as the impediments and hesitations on both sides. In 
substance, the idea of a recovery based on the expansion of mass-consumption 
was rejected in favour of a return to the growth model of the 1920s.The 
ideology of productivity also met with lack of success: it was neither able 
to attract a widespread consensus, nor to contain Communism. This point, 
however, which concerns the short term, should also be seen from another 
point of view which takes long-term dynamics into consideration.
Marshall aid involved a modernization of industrial technologies and 
the organization of work, as well as a new orientation for Italian in­
dustrial culture. Slowly - much more slowly than in other countries - the 
inclination for change emerged. In addition to exports, the driving force 
behind postwar growth, the domestic market also expanded, thanks to state 
intervention. A number of firms adapted their production to this process, 
and in doing so, furthered it. In these cases, there was more room for 
modernizing proposals. Nevertheless, Italian society, as a whole, throughout 
the 1950s experienced a large-scale "forced accumulation" rather than a 
prosperity based upon productivity and mass consumption.
For this reason, any interpretation which emphasizes the americaniza- 
tion of national reality should be examined critically. The specificity of 
the Italian case, here examined, suggests that US productivity policy had 






















































































































































































"We too can prosper"
- ERP Aid and the politics of productivity in
Italy during the 1950s
'L'Europa per sollevarsi ha bisogno di nuove idee, non di applicare, bene o 
male, quello che è stato fatto in America'
Adriano Olivetti
With the shift in historiographical interest from the vexed question of 
the origins of the Cold War to its impact upon contemporary societies, a key 
issue has been the nature (and limits) of the American postwar hegemony. 
This is no less knotty a problem, packed with interwoven economic, military 
and cultural implications that are hard to reduce to an unambiguous, linear 
scheme. One cannot avoid - even in a comparative setting - the special 
nature of this hegemony and of the ideology that moderated its 'command' 
aspects in practice. 'Politics of productivity' is the suggestive formula 
adopted by Charles Maier to define the main guiding motive of American 
approaches to the European societies after the Second World War (1). I shall 
attempt to set the implementation of this policy in a particular context, 
the Italian one, and offer a few conclusions on its incisiveness.
Maier's thesis can be summed up under three heads. First, he stresses 
the strong continuity of ideological approaches and political paradigms 




























































































had been thirty years before, the aims of material reconstruction in Europe 
were inseparable from those of social stabilization. However, the cultural 
baggage from which to draw adequate responses had become considerably en­
riched, starting with the debate on 'rationalization' in the 1920s. This 
thinking was common for a while to both shores of the Atlantic, from the 
second half of the thirties, brought to the US thanks largely to the migrant 
elites from Europe, with their intellectual commitment, which became politi­
cal in the New Deal. The idea of 'rationalization' as a permanent response 
to economic depression and as ideal ground for settlement of disputes under­
went a sharp pragmatic twist in the America of the 1930s, with the need for 
immediate answers to the tensions that had exploded in the great crisis. 
This was no mere interesting episode in cultural history. The New Deal, as 
Maier stresses, in all its complexity (and ambivalence), contained a concept 
of social engineering that was, as it were, destined for success.
Growth in productivity was secured through convergent action by the 
'public hand' (in the labour market and in mobilizing financial resources) 
and by the 'private hand' (technical modernization, product standardization, 
scientific management). This growth was converted into a two-fold virtuous 
circle. On the one hand, it supported mass production, i.e. the creation of 
supply to cope with increasing demand; on the other, through redistribution 
of profits in wage increases, it supported a wider market of mass 
consumption. Productivity and consumption were the poles of a sequence able 
to restrain tension and give new cohesion to the social system. Productivity 
is a common interest of worker and employer in the daily life of the firm, 
just as economic growth is a goal that all subjects must desire, whatever 
their position vis-à-vis the market. Clearly, on both sides social control




























































































The 'politics of productivity' was bipartisan in US political terms - among 
its proponents being the Democrat Harriman and the Republican Hoffman - 
despite the differing stresses on the role of the various subjects involved: 
public and private, unions and bosses. It secured increasing support among 
employers as it reduced the interventionism of the original New Deal, and 
from the unions since it left them considerable room for bargaining by 
suggesting the translation of wealth resulting from increased productivity 
into wage increases. While some intellectuals (and politicians) may have 
seen it as an undermining of Roosevelt's policies, at the Administration it 
seemed more the definition of a fixed - i.e. non-cyclical - terrain of 
autonomous powers. In fact, the politics of productivity called for a not 
inconsiderable institutional presence. The Agency, the institution called on 
to sustain the corporatist pluralism inherent in the plan, far from depriv­
ing the bureaucracy of power, definitively legitimized its function by 
extending its mediatory role (2).
The second outstanding point of Maier's interpretation, developed also 
by students of the war economy, is the decisive contribution to the politics 
of productivity offered by practical experimentation resulting from the war 
situation. What might have remained an episodic experiment linked to the 
great crisis, became daily practice in the US as early as 1941-5, and the 
daily bread of the Truman Administration's 'Fair Deal' (3). For this reason 
too, for the US policy to postwar Europe productivity drive simultaneously 
developed into a paradigm. Faced with the problems of the postwar situation, 
the administration delegated postwar planning to people and institutions 
linked in many ways to the politics of productivity of the later New Deal. 




























































































problems seemed to lie primarily in a transposition of the economic and 
social mechanism that had overcome the crisis in the US.
What is questionable in this part of Maier's analysis - careful as he 
is to recall the precedents from the 1920s for this attitude towards the 
export of an economic and social 'model' - is the underestimation of motives 
related more directly to the dynamics of international relations in the 
interpretation of US postwar foreign policy (4). There is also perhaps an 
overestimation of internal consensus for the plan, especially in the years 
when North American public opinion returned to isolationism. What is certain 
is that it was the anti-Soviet priority and the 'red peril' within the 
European societies that rendered acceptable to the various branches of the 
US political system the idea that it was somehow necessary to 'reform 
capitalism' in the old continent. It was only in a backward society or one 
without redistribution of the benefits of growth to workers (and consumers) 
that communism could put down roots, undermining the societies and the 
international alliances from within and reopening the way to totalitarianism 
in Europe. This was the most consistent reasoning for those who believed in 
a 'technical' solution to social conflict and in democracy based not so much 
on mass political participation as on mass market participation, in the 
specific form of exponential growth in consumption (5). The economism of the 
politics of productivity, already clear in its impact on US society, is 
still more striking in the European social context; but this fact was to be 
picked up only later. In the late 1940s, the plan was if anything one of the 
few interpretive keys available to US officials and public opinion seeking 
to understand the dialectics of European society. The key had a twofold 
ideological appeal. It confirmed those who held it in their own perception 



























































































(goods and technology), but also 'values', prolonged the dream of 'manifest 
destiny' and tended to transform officials into crusaders (6). On the other 
hand, the most sensitive continental interlocutor, the middle class shaken 
by the collapse of the pivotal ideologies of European civilization, the 
nationalisms, still mistrustful of socialism, saw it as restoring a set of 
traditional values reinterpreted in the light of practical success as daily 
displayed by American prosperity. Thus, through the interaction of several 
subjects, the politics of productivity was able to become the ideological 
cement for a hegemony with specific financial, economic, political and 
military repercussions, which we cannot go into here.
This concatenation of themes and links had as its active centre the 
Marshall Plan. Not that the ERP - the devising of which was rather troubled 
and contradictory - was a direct translation of the project into practical 
economic policy; it was more the opportunity that partly set going, or 
gathered together, trends and fragments from a number of preexisting 
projects, and partly a constraint on the various interlocutors to adjust to 
it or react (7). By comparison with Maier's interpretation, close considera­
tion of the ERP affair leads to still more insistence on the non-linearity 
of US policy and particularly the unhomogeneity of European response to the 
politics of productivity.
On the one hand, the plurality of American decision-making centres 
opened the road to differentiation in space and time of positions on the key 
questions: how to contain the Soviet Union and the communists; what social 
and political forces to favour in bilateral relations; whether to 'reform' 
or simply 'restore' capitalism. Responses in different countries and to 
different phases of the ERP cannot always be related back to the politics of 




























































































tend to believe. There was an open reaction to the 'Americanization' of 
cultural, technological and social paradigms - to mention only three areas - 
now receiving attention from researchers (8). There was a less passive 
adaptation than believed, even where the politics of productivity seemed to 
meet with complete success, as in Britain and West Germany. We should there­
fore ask whether the option for productivity growth and the finding of 
institutions capable of predetermining the distribution of the benefits of 
growth owed more to the American plan or to preexisting political traditions 
and autonomous social strategies. Corporatist pluralism is, at bottom, a 
policy with European features (9). Anyway, the plan did not seem as new in 
every country as it did in Italy.
In the context of the Marshall Plan, the most consistent US pursuit of 
politics of productivity goes back to 1949. There is no doubt that the aim 
of 'self-sustaining' economic growth, present from the initial formulation 
of the programme in summer 1947, implied substantial modification also of 
trends in productivity of capital and labour in Europe. But the main stress 
was on restoring the balance of payments of the old continent; or rather, 
the individual national payment balances with the US. This immediately 
shifted attention to issues of rehabilitating internal finances, stabilizing 
prices and exchange rates, and restoring multilateralism in international 
trade. The international economic policy introduced by Bill Clayton - as 
more attentive historians have noted - moves in this direction, though not 
without contradictions (10). Given the impossibility of restoring the 
central position of Europe (and Britain) in the system of international 
trade, the US sought financial remedies for a structural imbalance. The 
result, in 1949, was an impasse, worse because it coincided with US trade 




























































































in agreement on the assessment of European problems - faced with the 
umpteenth sterling crisis and the related European inability even to 
mutually coordinate distribution of ERP .aid, shifted attention towards 
differences in productivity and different market sizes. The autumn 1949 
currency readjustment was the precondition for an approach to the structural 
problems of European reconstruction. The demand and supply sides were faced 
simultaneously. Insistence on productivity was combined with the pressure 
for liberalization of trade. Productivity, standardization and expansion of 
consumption and liberalization of trade were part of a single line of action 
( 11) .
Economic motivations went together with social and political 
considerations. Between 1947 and 1949, the inflow of goods and the massive 
propaganda and financial intervention, both political and military (as in 
Greece), certainly shifted internal equilibria in favour of the conservative 
parties. But tensions were not at all lacking. The very strength of the 
larger communist parties in western Europe was notable. Their disintegra­
tion, hoped and striven for, came neither in Italy nor in France. In Italy 
political agitation even intensified, involving new areas such as the south. 
Here too, then, the logic of emergency intervention in support of other 
initiatives had to be transcended. To overcome the destabilizing forces, 
social relationships needed to be redesigned within a framework of develop­
ment, instead of backwardness. 'Productivity' then became a true 'political 
philosophy'.
Confirmation of this development is to be sought within the ERP 
mechanism. Until autumn 1949, the illusion of a short-term solution to 
Europe's problems meant subordination of the Politics of productivity to 




























































































Ellwood - the task of transmitting the decisive impulse for modernization of 
managerial (and union) behaviour to the economic system was initially 
entrusted to the 'Technical Assistance' division of the ECA. Section 11a of 
the Economic Cooperation Act of 3 April 1948 provided for bilaterally coor­
dinated initiatives in this direction. The ECA itself specified what was 
meant: study of ways of increasing productivity of industry and farming; 
study of conditions on the various internal and world markets, to facilitate 
sale of products; study of existing relationships between employers and 
workers 'and ways of utilizing workers' ideas to reduce production costs and 
improve social relationships'; organization of government departments with a 
view to financial reform and assignment of new economic powers; studies on 
development possibilities in colonies and dependent territories. As with 
other aspects of ERP legislation, here too the agency was overwhelmed with 
suggestions, linked not only with the above-mentioned general goals but with 
more specific needs and attitudes of Congress and internal pressure groups. 
The last point, for instance, showed US interest in using the resources of 
Europe's colonies more than a will to redefine what we now call north-south 
relationships. But apart from that, one should note the low financing 
provided for in the Act (6 million dollars in the first year), even regard­
ing the task as defined; this allocation proved to be triple the actually 
used funds, with the disappointing result for the first year of the divi­
sion's life of the reversion of 4 million dollars to the treasury (12).
Truman's state of the nation message of 20 January 1949, however, 
relaunched this line of action. Confirming the three major goals of US 
foreign policy as participation in the UN and consolidation of its role, 
development of the ERP and constitution of the Atlantic Pact, the President 




























































































in cooperation with other countries, in particular for development of 
natural resources in 'depressed areas' of the world and for improving stan­
dards of living, of America's accumulated technical progress. The transfer 
of technology and know-how was explicitly linked not only with bilateral 
relationships between administrations or public agencies, but with market 
mechanisms, i.e. US private investment abroad. In June 1949 the President 
asked Congress for a first appropriation for this of 45 million dollars. A 
few months earlier, 17 million dollars had been requested for technical 
assistance to European countries in the second year of the ERP. The problems 
of backward areas - rendered politically explosive by Asian events - were 
combined with Europe's, where material reconstruction was not leading to the 
hoped-for self-sustained growth. Hence the urgency of rethinking the pre­
vious year's figures (13). The programme of Technical Assistance to Europe, 
then, took off in autumn 1949, with striking differences in impact from 
country to country.
It is worthwhile looking at the extremes. In Britain, acceptance of the 
American programme seemed complete. In spring 1947, the Labour Party had 
already set the objective of increased productivity at the centre of its 
economic programme, as key to national reconstruction. "To increase national 
output, every worker must increase his own productivity. Labour Party mem­
bers should help the Labour government to bring both workers and managers to 
meditate on collaboration for a society founded upon abundance instead of 
antagonism in a society characterized by restrictions'. Nevertheless, even 
in such seemingly ideologically prepared terrain for the central message of 
the US initiative, its specific terms met with mistrust and hostility. The




























































































opposed, not just by the Labour left but also by influential press organs 
and conservative political circles.
No historian has reconstructed the long diplomatic bargaining leading 
to the birth of the Anglo-American Council of Productivity (AACP), but the 
British objections to it are well known. Fear of breach of industrial 
secrets by American technicians and proud emphasis that transatlantic 
economic superiority depended on quite other factors than modernity of plant 
and technologies (not to mention the widespread conviction of the in­
feriority of US trade unions, offered as a model) were part of a more 
complex attitude of coldness towards the whole of US international economic 
policy (14).
Accepted chiefly for political reasons - thanks to the decisive commit­
ment of Stafford Cripps - the AACP soon became the starting point for 
similar initiatives in France and Germany. While in France the 'productivity 
campaign' was an integral part of the modernization programme pursued by 
Monnet and the Commissariat Général au Plan (15), in Germany its institu­
tional and programmatic features suggest considerable continuity with the 
'rationalizing' ideologies and initiatives of the 1920s (16). In both cases, 
as in Britain, the American programme, though assimilated, was reinterpreted 
and redefined in unequivocably specific national terms. Insistence on the 
'Mitbestimmung' aspects of a productivity programme in Germany, or British 
officiousness over national supervision even of research done by foreign 
technicians, are significant indicators.
And Italy? "The CIR-ERP and the Italian delegation for economic 
cooperation, together with the ECA mission to Italy, have for some time been 
studying problems related to technical assistance, in particular analysing 




























































































a full programme for coordinating ERP technical assistance in our country" 
(17). From the political viewpoint, Italian commitment had not been lacking, 
especially through the lively interest shown by the country right from the 
first talks on the ERP - with firms, public bodies, unions and employers' 
associations - in developing technical and scientific exchange. The list of 
sectors that were to be covered by coordination through the committee and 
its sub-committees is long: study and divulgation of technical procedures, 
technical missions to the US and other ERP countries, meetings with American 
technicians in Italy etc. But as the national commitment became more 
defined, the complex of motives and aims publicized by the ECA shrank to the 
bare bones of not much more than modest support for the flow of know-how 
that some Italian and US firms had already developed, not only after the 
war, but even in the '20s and '30s. The first ECA appropriation, of 1 mil­
lion dollars to be drawn from the Technical Assistance Fund on presentation 
of particular programmes, and 500 million Italian lire of the Interim Aid 
for costs in local currency, were significant but hardly overwhelming 
amounts. Enough to finance study trips to the US by experts from the Bank of 
Italy, Finance Ministry, main agricultural administrations but not to set 
going the virtuous circle of adaptation of new technologies and new or­
ganizational models - productivity growth - that all felt would soon solve 
the Italian economy's basic imbalance vis-à-vis the US (18).
This is not to underplay the importance of the first steps in the US 
technical assistance programme, thanks to which, essentially, Italian trade 
unionism consolidated its transatlantic cultural and economic links. US 
trips by 'democratic trade unionists' were indeed to be the ECA's most 
publicized outcome, not only inside Italy, but also in the annual report to 




























































































The Italian 'underestimation' of the TA programme, clear from the 
outset, was to become still more evident in later years.
In January 1951, the ECA had authorized expenditure of 19.8 million 
dollars by the sixteen member countries of the OEEC. 46% of these funds were 
used, but the average concealed highly divergent national results. In some 
countries, where the productivity campaign was accepted and adapted to 
overall planning of economic and technical resources for reconstruction, the 
average was reached; where technical assistance had early come to mean 
support for defence programmes - as in Greece and to some extent Germany - 
the proportion of appropriations spent was higher. By contrast, Italy spent 
only 15.1% of the sums available. In the area of industrial productivity 
studies, Italian capacity to use the sums earmarked was still less. In the 
decisive sector, at least according to declarations by the relevant 
authorities, of studies on use of Italian labour abroad, expenditure was no 
more than 21,500 dollars out of 456,400 authorized, all for costs of US 
trips (20). While the interministerial committee's official publications 
refrained from comment, there were bitter reactions from public opinion. 
"That the purpose was primarily tourism," wrote E. Massacesi in "Mondo 
Economico" of the trips, "was often all too apparent." The difference be­
tween the 'productivity' of technical assistance in Britain and Italy was 
striking, reflecting differing overall government attitudes to development 
promotion (21).
The ECA mission to Italy itself found the experience of technical 
assistance disappointing by comparison with the intentions. Criticism began 
as soon as the unsatisfactory results of the first year came out. In spring 
1949, in parallel with the critical readjustment to the Country Study 




























































































the job of redefining the tasks of the technical assistance programme in 
Italy. These tasks were to be the organizational support to the 'turn round' 
in Italian economic policy hoped for in the country study. Biddle's report 
stressed the mission's unanimity on the need for 'administrative reform', to 
make the results of Italian reconstruction last: a reform involving both 
incisive tax policy and efficient tax administration within a framework of 
organic coordination at ministerial level of economic policy. Technical 
assistance was to play a leading role in modernizing Italian administrative 
machinery, eliminating its authoritarian centralism and bureaucratic 
rigidity. This meant bringing the productivity 'message' from Washington to 
the heart of the public and private economic structure. Given the lack of 
progress, unease returned. The impression is - as can be read in a summary 
note from the ECA Technical Assistance Division in Washington of October 
1950 - that the Italian government never had any clear idea of technical 
assistance as investment in overall economic policy. The study of the US tax 
system by experts from the relevant Italian ministry, it stressed, brought 
no significant changes to the fiscal reform bill being discussed by 
Parliament. The research into US national accounting criteria had not im­
proved Italian statistics.
The meagre results and the patent uninterest of the Italian inter­
locutors - from Confindustria to government - did not stop US determination 




























































































The 14 tools for productivity.
While in the first phase of the Marshall Plan productivity increases 
had been perceived as essential for giving European economic reconstruction 
independence and prospects, once the international situation became 
dominated by the Korean War such increases became still more urgent. The 
danger of a new conflict in Europe had shifted US attention entirely to the 
question of continental defence. ERP aid itself was subordinated to 
rearmament. This could not be achieved in economies stifled by obsolescence 
or plant underutilization. On the other hand, the only way not to make 
military expenditure impinge on civil consumption and cramp the current 
upswing with new sacrifices was to raise labour productivity considerably. 
"Guns and butter" were reconcilable - as the US example showed once again - 
in this very way. Hence a thoroughgoing escalation of the productivity 
drive.
The new ECA administrator, W. Foster, made this point the centre of the 
Marshall Plan's last phase. The Mutual Security Agency, in charge of post- 
ERP military aid programmes, confirmed this position in subsequent years.
The '14 points for productivity' were the programme for this turn 
round. Europe's material reconstruction was almost complete, was the basic 
thesis, but prospects still seemed uncertain, and not merely because of the 
latent danger of renewed conflict. There was a persisting fragility in the 
Western economic mechanism that should be opposed by a decisive qualitative 
leap in the dynamics of investments and consumption. It was again stressed 
that the path to follow was adaptation of American technologies and or­




























































































The national productivity centres to be set up in each country on the 
basis of the positive experience with the Anglo-American Council for 
Productivity were the keystone of the whole proposal (23). This institution 
would bring together the interests involved in the productivity effort, but 
also be an effective agency in daily operations: in a word, the 'central 
nervous system controlling the efforts at increasing productive efficiency'. 
It 'should favour collaboration among industrial managers, workers and the 
government, and is to be regarded as a permanent institution to pursue the 
national productivity programme after the end of the Marshall Plan', says 
point 1. Once again, however, the means seemed disproportionate to the ends: 
exchange of technical information (points 2, 7, 12, 13 and 14), studies on 
standardization (point 3), exchange of technical consultants (point 4) and 
trade union experts (point (9), product analysis and supply of samples 
(points 5 and 6), professional training programmes (point 8) and technical 
assistance missions (points 10 and 11) (24).
It was hard for even the most favourably disposed commentators to 
discern how these 'channels' might have helped 'the ECA's efforts to secure 
fair distribution of the benefits deriving from higher output volume, among 
labour, the consumer, the employer and management', in Foster's words. 
"Mondo Economico", the most authoritative Italian technical journal, 
commented: "In fact this is likely much ado about nothing. Technical assis­
tance will perhaps be developed, productivity centres will be set up, 
conferences will meet ...". The US could not share this scepticism, espe­
cially since the 'productivity drive' was seen as the most incisive 
response, also in propaganda terms, to the pacifist tendencies running 
through European public opinion, more or less inspired by the left. In fact 




























































































alive the collective expectation of widespread prosperity. The direct appeal 
to labour to produce weapons of extermination, a few years after the end of 
a war, was useless, since it could help only the adversary. The idea of 
'armed prosperity' was much more attractive. This meant an extension of the 
cooperation amongst social forces already tried out during reconstruction. 
Once again, the employer was called upon to free himself from the tradi­
tional mental habits of a blind accumulator of wealth, while the unions were 
to emphasize their 'natural' vocation for cooperation in the firm.
'Productivity in the proper sense does not mean more goods with less 
labour, but more goods at lower prices with more labour better paid. 
Paradoxically, this does not mean cutting profits; on the contrary, ex­
perience has taught that greater output at lower cost can even increase 
profit, as long as cost reductions are made to benefit the consumer'. This 
was the summary message to readers of "Produttività" from L. Dayton, head of 
the MSA mission to Italy.
The consensus that met this phase too of the productivity campaign 
should not be underestimated. The first to give support were the forerunners 
of scientific management, like F. Mauro, whose first edition of 'The US seen 
by an engineer' rapidly sold out, or T. Bianchi, who saw 'productivity' as 
an update of 'Fordism'. Also receptive, however, were the Catholic circles, 
especially in Milan, engaged on adapting Christian social culture to the 
times. Padre Gemelli stressed the difference between productivity ideology 
and Taylorism, seeing the first as freeing man from domination by the 
machine, thanks to the stress on the 'human factor'.
According to G. Moro Visconti, productivity, understood this way, could 
correct 'the distortion in income distribution which, while compressing the 




























































































has favoured production of luxury goods while essential items are still 
short'. It was, in short, the approach to solving the social question; the 
time when 'labour takes on the meaning of prayer' was approaching. Few, 
however, took the message quite so widely (25).
The first body to be put to the test was the government. Response from 
the executive was extremely slow, despite repeated pressure on the Prime 
Minister by the US agencies and Embassy between autumn 1950 and October 
1951.
De Gasperi's constant concern was to restrain interference by the 
'reforming' ally. This should be seen as evidence not of abstract claims of 
autonomous sovereignty, but of specific resolve to check economic policy 
lines foreign to his own, rather conservative, plan (26). The eventual 
acceptance of the US request for specific commitments does not refute this 
assessment. The National Productivity Committee was born neither as a body 
for coordinating government economic policy - as US officials and Italian 
CISL trade unionists had hoped - nor as a private body as advocated by the 
social sectors interested in productivity. No outside centre was possible 
for that concertation of interests that De Gasperi saw as the exclusive 
prerogative of the executive. Accordingly, the NPC, by contrast with what 
happened in France and Britain, was an emanation of the prime minister's 
office. The powers laid down by the decree of 22 October 1951 setting it up 
were modelled on those of the technical assistance committee of the CIR, 
with one single significant specification. The committee was to 'formulate a 
general action programme to improve productivity, indicating practical 
measures for implementing the programme itself with regard also to emphasiz­
ing the human factor in firms, with particular reference to better use of 




























































































classes'. No mention of policies to support technological innovation or of 
repercussions of investment on consumption. The Committee was an exclusively 
consultative body - without legal personality or organizational structure - 
transitory (three year term) and without independent financial resources. 
Just as significant was the reduction in the body's representativity. Of its 
37 members, 8 represented employers and 8 the unions. Then there were three 
representatives of craft unions and small industries. These were flanked by 
no less than 13 experts appointed by the ministries and the prime minister. 
Despite the exclusive reference to labour productivity, the committee's 
composition was unbalanced, against the unions. This contradiction, though 
denounced by the CISL that claimed responsibility for promoting the NPC, was 
reproduced at peripheral level. At the centre the committee was an appendix 
to the CIR secretariat; locally, the productivity centres were emanations of 
the Chambers of Commerce (27).
The successive amendments to this structure confirmed the largely 
irrelevant nature of the body by comparison with other countries' centres. 
The NPC was to ease import of new organizational methods, nothing more: a 
sort of quango for scientific management.
In substance, the institutional solution confirmed that the govern­
ment's economic policy was operating on a different wavelength. Also 
different from that of its US interlocutors was its idea of participation in 
decision-making by representatives of interests. A similar difference was 
noted by industrial circles. Confindustria representatives, very favourable, 
as was said, to promoting circulation of technical knowledge and very under­
standing as regards import of US technology, did not hide their mistrust of 
the American 'crusade' in favour of productivity. The position repeatedly 




























































































vigour, calls for a less superficial explanation than usually given. The 
central issue for the industry representatives in those years was cohesion 
of their own interest block. Costa's hostility to 'useless and harmful 
didactic attitudes' by the Americans is to be explained as perception of a 
disruptive element vis-à-vis the painstaking sectoral mending operation 
being carried out by the Confindustria as an intrinsic part of the stress on 
productivity and technological innovation. In his speech to the Congress of 
US and European employers in New York, Costa repeated that the American 
model of proserity was not applicable to a backward, overpopulated national 
context like the Italian, without fear of implicitly contradicting the 
affirmations of Valleta and Pirelli to the same congress. The objective was 
a line on which big and small firms could converge, along with the most 
backward, closed elements on the country's manufacturing scene, not merely 
the most direct beneficiaries of ERP aid and of advanced technology imported 
under the Marshall Plan. For the same reason, Costa had not hesitated to 
associate the criticisms by Dayton in 1950 with 'subversive communism'; or 
Finance Minister Vanoni's specific opposition with the 'confused' anti­
capitalist message of La Pira. No one - he said - was better able than the 
entrepreneurs to establish an efficient combination of the productive fac­
tors in a firm. Productivity could be sustained by the State through easy 
credit terms for firms and giving exporters the same benefits as in compet­
ing countries. This was the tough response to those who instead proposed 
sharper taxation and closer attention to economic policy on the internal 
market as pivotal to a different idea of 'productivity'. The difference from 
the 'American dirigisme' goes further. By comparison with the NPC, Costa was 
against any notion of institutionalizing collaboration between the social 




























































































productivity solely as consumers. The rejection of 'joint committees' and 
company productivity agreements was matched by the hollow undermining of the 
national committee at the centre and of the. provincial committees at the 
periphery. This opposition recalls the tones of the victorious battle waged 
against the 'consigli di gestione' and technical committees repeatedly 
proposed even by the industry ministries between 1945 and 1951. The rejec­
tion of dirigisme inspired a brutal frankness. Not that this excluded 
positive relationships with US businessmen themselves at strictly economic 
or technical levels. At ideological level, however, Costa tends to counter­
pose the philosophy of 'entrepreneur privatisin' to that of productivity; 
this is how the study conventions on economics and industrial policy 
promoted by the business organization have to be understood (28).
This attitude of the business association considerably affected the 
success of the American initiative and the behaviour of other Italian 
interlocutors. The 'politics of productivity' particularly challenged the 
'free' trade unions. Acceptance of this terrain, especially by the CISL, has 
often been attributed to the influence of American union ideologies on that 
confederation. This assessment may be shared with two reservations. The 
first is chronological: the assimilation of a complex heritage - or parts of 
it - like that of US trade unionism is a quite slow and contradictory 
process. The ideological binder of the confederation, especially at the 
level of intermediate cadres, was for years to be almost exclusively anti­
communism, along with the religious appeal, or at least political support 
for the relative majority party. The second reservation is logical: accept­
ance of the terrain of productivity proposed by the ECA was an immediate 




























































































(29). This was evident right from the third General Council of the con­
federation, held in Bari in January 1951.
The Korean situation and the priority on productivity were on that 
occasion interpreted as circumstances favouring a reallocation of the union 
within the political and economic system. 'It might be easier,' says 
Pastore's report, 'in an emergency situation to secure recognition of the 
workers' right to responsible cooperation in leading the public economy and 
the economy of the firm than to secure a bigger share in distribution of the 
value of the product' (30). The logic is clear. The aim of higher labour 
productivity can be reached with union support, for an exchange: not wage 
increases but institutionalization of union participation in economic policy 
decisions. This is far from the US plan, as American labour attaches in­
volved did not fail to point out. The CISL showed its basic subordination to 
the free trade orthodoxy that sees wage increases as a permanent cause of 
financial instability. It also reveals a deeper wish. The legitimacy the 
confederation was not getting from social relationships was sought 
institutionally. Thus, the CISL did not condemn the discrimination among 
various trade union organizations explicitly allowed by Article 3 of the 
decree setting up the NPC. After 1952 the confederation's documents contain 
criticism of the shortcomings of national economic policy, but simul­
taneously an illusion persists: these shortcomings can be overcome through a 
voluntarist appeal to the other side for "cooperation" (31). The bodies 
indicated for conciliating interests are more specific: the joint production 
committees, at company level, and the National Productivity Committee, on a 
strict parity basis, at the centre. The former were of course rejected by 
the Confindustria, but were never to become an object of trade union demands 




























































































favourable to labour demands was lost. Hence emerged the option for bargain­
ing aimed at linking wages to productivity growth (General Council at 
Ladispoli)(33). The Confindustria and the executive, on the other hand, 
always welcomed the announcement of willingness to cooperate at company 
level by the CISL, contrasting it with the CGIL's 'non-collaboration'.
This union's retreat from an interpretation of its own of productivity 
politics to an acceptance of a subordinate position within the firm and in 
the political system was clear. The support for the experiment of 
'demonstrative firms' promoted by the NCP was that the lowest point of the 
'free' unions 'alignment' on the initiatives of government and also of the 
employers. The adoption in 1952 of the 'demonstrative firms' programme gave 
a new dimension, of importance locally, to the NPC's activity. In addition 
to Vicenza, also involved in the joint action by the NPC and the Mutual 
Security Agency were Palermo, Salerno, Pisa and Monza.
The Vicenza experience is worth considering, even summarily. The aim 
was to show the advantages achievable in a firm, in terms of increased 
production and improved internal relationships, from systematic application 
of the new methodologies, consisting in organizational advice to management, 
training of leaders at all levels, simplification of work and education of 
employees. 'The American technicians assisting the NPC', an official publi­
cation pointed out,'stated that this was the method whereby the US had 
overcome the 1929-32 crisis and adapted the productive framework to the 
enormous growth in output necessitated by intervention in the Second World 
War'. It went on, 'the benefit from the cost reductions secured was divided 
threeways: to the firm through increased profit, to the worker through 
productivity bonuses, to the consumer through price cuts. The resulting gain 




























































































large part of the population had reactivated production, eliminated most 
unemployment and brought an end to a crisis whose consequences might have 
been disastrous' (34). The experiment had involved the firms of Laverda, 
Sartori, Ceccato, Zambon, and later Beaupain, Campagnolo, ILMA, Saccardo and 
the government installation of Recoaro.
Over a year and a half, the NPC technicians, along with 240 from the 
firms, developed the 'training within industry' programme according to the 
traditional scheme: human relations at work, employee education, improvement 
in work methods, bilateral communications, safety, arrangement of machines, 
flow of work, internal transport, simplfication of work. Outside advice to 
management, on the other hand, concerned the general organization of produc­
tion, industrial accounting, the measurement of productivity, i.e. time and 
methods, and marketing.
The rather frequent speeches by Ceccato and Laverda to meetings on 
productivity - often held at Vicenza, which had become not just the location 
of one of the most important American military bases in Italy, but also the 
Italian capital of the productivity drive - leave no room for uncertainty 
about the successive experiment. The industrial assessments were welcomed by 
the US press, at the suggestion of the mission to Italy. In 'Time', R. 
Christopher drew a rosy picture: employment in the demonstrative firms had 
increased, production was up 23% and wages up 10% thanks to productivity 
bonuses. Prices were down. The political results, continued the author, were 
no less: in 1953 the CGIL had 4 delegates out of 7 at Ceccato; by 1954 2 had 
gone over to the CSIL, which now controlled the internal committee. 
Productivity was confirmed as the best weapon against communism.
However, there was another side to the experiment, deliberately con­




























































































Ceccato did not treat its turners, fitters etc. as 'skilled workers', 
and the wages of 'semi-skilled labourers' were less than 8 lire per hour. 
Overtime was paid 'outside the pay packet', to avoid insurance 
contributions. Avoidance of the overtime rate itself was frequent. The 
apprentices' contract - they were many in the Vicenza firm - gave them 10- 
15,000 lire per month for 9 or more hours daily work. Individual bonuses did 
not exceed 60-70% of pay. As in many other small and medium firms in the 
country, little of the contract could be said to have been respected (35).
E. Landolfi recalled in the columns of the social democratic 
newspaper 'La Giustizia' that the basis of the 'human relations' in the firm 
remained the fear of sacking. A further negative assessment comes from an 
impeccable source, Adriano Olivetti, who recalls, referring to the introduc­
tion of a 'suggestion box' in the firm: 'in one of the biggest of these 
works, a suggestion from a worker that saved the firm 400,000 lire per year 
was rewarded with the derisory lump sum payment of 10,000 lire. Another 
suggestion that saved 2 million was rewarded with less than 20,000 lire. 
This shows clearly how the American methods were applied in ridiculous 
fashion by the Italian organization that ought to have been specialized in 
their adoption' (36). Olivetti's criticism raised a hornet's nest of polemic 
on the NPC's role, just when even the 'free' unions were most clearly dis­
sociating themselves from the 'superexploitation experiments' - the UIL's 
term - of Vicenza.
'The workers' organizations,' asserted Viglianesi, UIL leader at the 
productivity meeting in July 1953, 'are often forced on to the defensive by 
the employers' line, which is not always orthodox as regards the guiding 
spirit of the campaign to increase productivity, and by the absentee posi­




























































































encouraging employers to observe a principle they freely accept, formal 
membership in the campaign to increase productivity'.
His position repeated an executive resolution of January. Worker par­
ticipation in the benefits of increased productivity was regarded as 
inseparable not just from institutionalization of 'reciprocal' consultation 
at company level, but - be it noted - from a freeze on dismissals and from 
absolute respect for labour contract, social insurance laws and the specific 
agreements in the demonstrative firms. The Mutual Security Agency was also 
asked for guarantees that it would subordinate increases in orders to 
Italian firms to specific commitments in that direction (37).
Productivity had been interpreted by these political and trade union 
elements as a power idea 'destined to polarize around itself /the/ less 
backward forces of capital and labour'. But two years after adoption of the 
programme, it had to be concluded that these forces 'are still linked to the 
extreme positions of conservative monopoly capitalism and of anti- 
productivity communist unionism' (38).
At the second national congress, the CISL recognized, speaking through 
Pastore, that the productivity increase achieved over the four years from 
1951 to 1954 had meant 'absolutely no increase in worker incomes', while the 
NPC 'had created essentially nothing new' (39).
Basically, Italy was repeating what had happened in most European 
countries involved in the productivity drive. A phase of full union coopera­
tion, elsewhere reluctantly granted but in Italy accentuated by the search 
for legitimacy by the 'free' elements, much in the minority in firms, was 
followed by gradual autonomization of trade union action.
During 1953 the 'free' unions proved increasingly sceptical about the 




























































































committee, and similar criticism of their national centres had come from the 
French and Belgian organizations. In the Scandinavian countries, instead, 
union involvement in the whole of economic planning had brought a different 
attitude to technological innovation and to changes in work organization at 
company level (40).
Essentially, the unions saw the decline of what we would today call 
the 'neocorporatist' intent inherent in the programme, noted even by its 
promotors: 'This productivity affair,' commented an MSA representative, F.A. 
Baird, 'has simplified itself in our hands; it has diminished in size as it 
got more concrete, till it assumed the outlines and dimensions of an honest 
problem of technique and of scientific work organization'. Why? The US 
reports did not manage to go beyond noting many organizational shortcomings. 
There was no autocritical idea of a 'technocratic' approach, partial 
and abstract. However, the same question was put to circles more open to the 
productivity philosophy. E. Massacesi commented that there had been a move 
'from a technical problem, to arrive at structural reforms able to transform 
the old capitalist system into a modern, more alive, more social system'. 
But the overall political dimension implied by that transformation had been 
lost sight of. Without organic economic action by the state, even an in­
crease in industrial productivity is unreachable. Had productivity and 
production not perhaps been confused? 'On the path of productivity,' wrote 
"Mondo Economico", 'in the sense of improvements to plant and productive 
processes, there does not seem much possibility in the present state of 
affairs, at least in Italy, to advance. Our need now is more for raw 
materials and for outlets, and especially for a global economic policy that 




























































































Harsh criticism of the limitations of the Italian version of the 
productivity drive came from public opinion not aligned on left-wing 
positions. Like the CGIL, concerned to. counterpose to the productivity 
campaign at company level a fight for full use of the productive capacity of 
the whole economic system, "Mondo Economico" seemed, however, to underes­
timate what was actually happening in firms.
Stressing the limits of the productivity campaign, as we have done so 
far, and the gap between American plan and national 'adaptation', should not 
mean ignoring the ongoing technical modernization and rationalization of 
work organization. If the 'reform of capitalism' in Europe, and specifically 
in Italy, hoped for by Washington was not happening because of the ERP and 
post-ERP aid, it is nevertheless true that thanks to that aid, profound 
changes at microeconomic level were initiating bigger shifts. Ultimately, 
the productivity campaign missed the more ambitious general aims, but opened 
the path to a considerable renewal of industrial and cultural practice in 
the country. The mass consumption boom was instead to arrive later, with 
marked national peculiarities. The prosperity - hoped for by the ECA - was 
not to deaden nor de-ideologize the conflict, and indeed was, incredibly, to 






















































































































































































Technical progress, productivity and consumption.
In the Marshall Plan's first year, the portion of aid consisting of 
credit to industry to purchase machinery from the United States was absorbed 
with difficulty. Apart from the undeniable complexity inherent in the IMI- 
ERP procedures, this worrying result was brought about by the uncertainty 
prevailing in Italian firms. The cases of FIAT and of nationalized iron and 
steel - like those of other complexes that had immediately moved towards 
modernization and expansion from the late 30s - should not be generalized. 
For its part, government economic policy did not define functional 
priorities for a rapid and coordinated process of 'reequipping' the in­
dustrial apparatus.
In 1949-50, however, this began to change. American encouragement 
connected with the Country Study played an important, though not exclusive, 
part here. The prospect of reopening the Italian economy to international 
competition and the guarantees of social stability offered by the Einaudi- 
Pella line probably had greater effect in motivating more tendency to 
invest. It is certain that there were positive effects on the whole program­
ming of the aid, with considerable growth in imports of plant from the US. 
The slogan 'less macaroni, more machinery' was becoming a reality (42).
Over a three-year period, investment in new equipment involved all the 
large and medium sized firms in the country. The import of machinery presup­
posed exchange of technical information and expansion of financial and 
commercial relationships between Italian and US firms.
Here are some examples of firms, confined to IMI-ERP requests for 
machinery. Steel and engineering have received the proper historiographical 




























































































Innocenti and Piaggio, which imported through ERP the complete equipment for 
scribing, pressing, fitting, welding and checking for the entire shell for 
the Lambretta and the Vespa, in addition to diecasting installations and 
automatic lathes used in various production sectors. Purchases by Alfa 
Romeo, Bianchi, Lancia and Singer were of similar scope. The same is true of 
Necchi , the productive restructuring of which, exemplary in the light en­
gineering sector, found decisive support from machinery imported through 
grants (43).
The textile industry too contained a sizeable proportion of producers 
engaged in modernization. Examples are Bemberg, TESIT, Caprotti, Jucker, 
SIFAC, Magnani e Tedeschi, or the Manifatture Cotoniere Meridionali, which 
imported automatic looms, winding frames and weft replenishers, bleaching 
installations, etc. (44).
Developments in the energy sector were still more striking. Under the 
ERP, Agip and other oil firms bought exploration drilling, well drilling, 
oil cracking, gas and methane cracking plants. Like oil refining, the broad­
casting industry was sustained in its expansion mainly by this type of 
import credit.
The electrical industry, one of the greatest beneficiaries of the IMI- 
ERP credit section, bought the large turbo-generating sets not produced in 
Italy, but also special machinery (condensers, pre-heaters, ash catchers 
etc.) for new power stations under construction.
The electrical engineering industry deserves separate treatment. Ercole 
Marelli established a direct relationship with Westinghouse and other com­
panies, enabling it to catch up on the technological lag discovered at the 
end of the war. This approach was also encouraged by the simultaneous drop­




























































































Italiana itself was among the major purchasers of special machines from the 
US - but this does not mean that it was a case of episodic relationships 
(45).
From these productive sectors to the tyre industry - CEAT and Pirelli 
were in the forefront of adaptation to the new mixing techniques perfected 
in the US - to the paper industry (Burgo), printing (Mondadori, Poligrafico 
dello Stato, etc.), in all cases mentioned, ERP imports represented only a 
part of the inflow of new plant. Purchases on the Italian market were often 
of no less importance.
However, we wish to concentrate not so much on the size of the process 
as on its quality. Imports covered a rather diversified range of machinery, 
from the simple comptometer - which in a few years' time was also being 
produced nationally - to the continuous rolling train, from automatic lathes 
to numerical controllers. Some basic characteristics with strong implica­
tions for productivity growth can however be traced.
The engineering industry - but the situation is similar in other sec­
tors - was tending to change definitively from an assembly industry to 
continuous production. This characteristic, present from the outset in 
textile, chemical, paper and oil installations, was further perfected there.
The introduction of conveyor belts - or their widespread distribution, 
since there were some during the war - implied a new dimension in the or­
ganization of production (46). The new machines changed not only the quality 
of work but its overall organization. Nor did rationalization spare the 
administrative functions, even if initially concentrated elsewhere (47).
One example, an electronics firm, may us give an impression. The tech­
nological modernization made possible between 1949 and 1951 by ERP credits 




























































































tunnel oven for drying the glue, instead of the line with no conveyor belt 
and traditional oven, brought an increase in hourly production of 64%. The 
efficiency of another production stage was tripled through purchase of a 
continuous wire twisting machine with foot controls, by comparison with the 
old hand winder. The automatic presses and punches brought increases varying 
from 24 to 150 per cent. There was an increase of no less than seven times 
in the amount of work possible, thanks to an automatic machine for cutting 
and fitting the ends of connecting wires. But investment in new technologies 
was not everything. Design and control, division of sectors and work methods 
all changed together. The 'human factor' was dealt with in three directions. 
Above all, there was an adaptation to Italian circumstances of employee 
assessment, successfully tried out by similar US firms. Dual job evaluation 
was introduced, for the individual and for tasks broken down into sequences. 
For the former, the foreman was asked to report on performance, attitudes, 
keenness etc. The centrality of the foreman was confirmed by the second 
approach consisting in the recording and study of time and methods. The same 
initiative was aimed at reducing job insecurity for the employee, resulting 
from the continuing seasonality of the productive cycle. In one year, over­
all production of this firm rose 25% (48).
There are therefore many sides to company rationalization: from the 
introduction of new machinery to the planning of production, from the 
restructuring of internal transport to the organization of purchasing, from 
automation of sector management to the adoption of modern marketing tech­
niques (49). These profoundly changed the social roles not only of skilled 
workers or traditional white-collar workers, but also of middle management. 
Technical reviews and congresses within an industry interchanged thinking on 




























































































road to others. Of course, the NPC and the ECA mission to Italy followed or 
were at the centre of many initiatives. Others were spread by an original 
network of technical advice centres and institutes, semi-public or private 
in nature. The bibliography gives an idea here of the deep undertow pulling 
at the traditional industrial culture and sowing the seeds of subsequent 
renewal. New installations and new organizational models went hand in hand. 
From this microeconomic viewpoint, the American-launched productivity drive 
seems to have given the hoped for fruit.
Total productivity in Italy rose faster than in almost any other 
Western economy. Between 1951 and 1955 the average annual rate of growth in 
labour productivity in industry was 6.4%, against 3.7% for the US and 3.1% 
for Britain (1949-55) (50). Even with technological modernization, there was 
however a fundamental difference between the Italian and the US paths 
to prosperity.
Across the Atlantic, the benefits of productivity, redistributed as 
wage increases, filtered back through consumption, encouraging new produc­
tive investment. The structure of the labour market pushed research into 
suitable ways of increasing labour output in one specific direction: labour 
saving investments.
The insistence on capital investment in new technologies once the phase 
of adaptation to international standards was passed, could not be shared by 
the Italian businessman. He was conditioned by a totally unfavourable capi­
tal market, by a highly elastic labour market and a restricted consumer 
market. To labour-saving investment, hard to amortize in the short-term in 
these circumstances, and a bearer of new social tensions, he always 
preferred productivity increases brought by fuller use of existing produc­




























































































Without enormous commitments to capital intensification in mechanization 
processes and automation of fixed installations, it was still possible to 
secure success. The special structure of the labour market allowed this 
'short cut', and even allowed, at least up to a certain point, avoidance of 
redistribution to workers of the benefits of increased productivity. Not 
that all businessmen acted thus; but this situation did open the way to a 
rather broad spread in employer attitudes and consequent territorial and 
sectorial dualisms, typical of the 1950s.
The resulting stagnation in real wages had a counterpart that produc­
tivity theorists cannot help judging negatively: the limitation of the 
internal market. The low standard of living went with low consumption. It 
was for more dynamic management to adapt the quantity and quality of product 
to this trend, at least somewhat, while looking outside the national market 
for demand capable of sustaining growth in supply.
This choice - with emphases differing through time and between firms - 
was not the result of thinking behind a desk. It can instead be seen as an 
empirical return to a 'model of growth' already tested successfully by many 
textile, engineering, food and chemical firms after the first world war. In 
the 1920s, a restricted internal market and a labour market position 
favourable to demand had coincided with international opening by the Italian 
economy. Thirty years later what had to be done was adapt a rather broader 
productive apparatus to similar lines. In this effort, rather varied 
theoretical approaches and practical experiences converged; but they were 
all unanimous in seeing as foreign to Italian reality and hence 'naieve' the 
model of growth proposed by the American productivity drive. The Bank of 
Italy and the Treasury, engaged in consolidating the currency reserves, to 




























































































domestically, and individual industrialists, involved in containing labour 
costs by means old and new, were pursuing essentially the same goal (52).
The partial acceptance of the US programme thus results not from misun­
derstanding the message but from a different strategic option related to the 
Italian economy's place in postwar Europe.
Clearly, the first to go beyond this partiality were the employers most 
committed to standardized production, which needs a mass market. Pirelli was 
already maintaining in 1952 that there was no 'contrast between a policy of 
full support to exports and one of stiffening the internal market', and 
Valletta, in 1954, was still more explicit: 'Growth in industrial produc­
tivity has no meaning unless directed at higher standards of living for the 
people' (53). But up to the middle of the decade, the prevalent attitude 
towards expansion of internal consumption was the opposite (54). 
Nevertheless the problem of the internal market was rather more worrying in 
Italy than in any other OEEC member country. Already during the Marshall 
Plan, Italy was slower to get back to 1938 indices, unexciting as those were 
in the history of the country. It was not until 1951 that private consump­
tion per head equalled 1929 values. In particular, food consumption 
expressed in constant values was equal to 1,473 lire as against the 1,526 of 
1929. The rise since 1946 - 965 lire - was clear, but the goal of alignment 
on average European expenditure was still far off. Spending on food was 56% 
of average income in 1938, but rose to 64% in the ERP years. Essentially, 
this item represented two-thirds of income for an Italian, as against a 
quarter for an American (55).
Other types of spending had shown very slight increases. In 1951, 
clothing was 16.3% of all spending, against 15% in 1938. By contrast, be­




























































































increase in luxury consumption - which made some critics deny that living 
standards were simply at subsistence level - was from a basis of prewar 
autarkic restrictions.
In big towns family consumption seems to rise steadily between 1951 and 
1954 at an average annual rate of 4.7%. After that year's crisis, there were 
considerable improvements in consumption of 'recreational and cultural goods 
and services' - the television 'boom' came in 1957 - and in car purchase. 
But in 1958 a Doxa study showed that 84% of Italian families had neither a 
television nor a refrigerator nor a washing machine. Two out of three white 
collar and almost all blue collar and agricultural workers had none of the 
three. In 1957 a worker's average monthly wage was still below the 70,000 
lire necessary, according to ISTAT, to maintain an average family. There was 
unsatisfied desire to consume: Doxa found that only 1% of workers had a car, 
but 65% wanted one.
The colour magazines spread the image of the electric cooker, the 
washing machine, even the airconditioner. The vacuum cleaner, 'recently 
invented, has been welcomed because of its real usefulness', we are told by 
'star' Milly Vitale, who adds 'today, apart from the vacuum cleaner, no 
house should lack a washing machine and a refrigerator. In America these 
items are so common that no housewife could live without them'.' In America 
...'; but in Italy the housewife's problems were different: how to make an 
old pair of shoes last one more year, how to pay for firewood or coal for 
the winter. There is no need to go as far as the dramatic portrayals of 
social reality in the big Italian towns produced by the parliamentary en­
quiry into poverty to get a fair picture of the standard of living and 




























































































The slow, troubled growth in instalment selling, on which there is no 
lack of valuable studies, is a rebuke to a climate scarsely shaken by in­
novatory ferments (56).
The sewing machine, the scooter, the versatile 'Proteus' electric fan 
which 'at the touch of a switch adapts to many household uses', were the 
first material signs of a change which was, with production of the first 
mass car, to make the link to the years of the 'miracle'. Industry adapted 
to a restricted market, consumption refused to line up with the 'American 
model' , the ideology and propaganda of 'we too can prosper' came daily up 
against the reality of a country which, more than the welfare of the 























































































































































































Italy in the 1950s: a half Americanized society
The productivity drive, though supported by the response that the 
'American myth' was always met with in the Italian consciousness - thanks to 
propaganda, to the recollections of emigration, to the memory of liberation 
or to the 'colonization of the unconscious' brought about by the mass media, 
broke down against reality rather than against opposing ideologies. This 
does not mean underestimating the social impact of the systematic opposition 
from the left to the whole initiative. The point is that the opposition's 
argument found more than one piece of confirmation from everyday life. 
Productivity was often nothing but 'superexploitation', 'human relations' 
were reduced in practice to 'pats on the back', the ideology of 'welfare' 
really seemed like a decoy, while rearmament and unemployment were in full 
swing (57).
There is no doubt that the left's perception of all the phases of the 
process considered here is oversimplistic. Everything is brought down to a 
manifestation of transatlantic imperialism pure and simple. 'Non­
collaboration' is a proud reassertion of a comprehensive refusal, the more 
sterile for being inflexibly bound up with the defence of jobs and skills 
irrevocably lost in the ongoing industrial restructuring.
The justified demand for full use of the country's productive 
capacities - well to the fore in the Piano del Lavoro and the struggles 
driving from it - shaded progressively off into a morally impeccable but 
minority protest. It has been called prisoner of a 'stagnationist' assess­
ment of the Italian economy and society. The dualisms were not received as 
such: the crisis of one industry or firm was a rebuke to a destiny of 




























































































the company action of the unions was underestimated and the decentralization 
of claims rejected. The criticism of the 'free' trade unions, accused of at 
best exasperating corporatism and social particularism, left no room for 
prospects of recomposition, still less for attempts at diversification of 
industrial action as such. Certainly, the CGIL was the big social 
protagonist in those years of the 1950s: firstly, it was its positions and 
initiatives - the production conferences, the 'white papers' on work condi­
tions and on civil rights in the factory, the disputes themselves - that 
were the measure not only for the 'free' trade unions but also for the 
Confindustria and the promotors of the productivity campaign (58). 
Nevertheless, the union failed to catch the meaning of the ongoing restruc­
turing and the link with the emergent new professional figures.
These are known facts that were to be underlined by the tortured 
process of revision in the later '50s, with attention mainly directed at new 
types of wages linked to profit assessment and to work organization (59).
These limits in the meantime made possible local and sectoral successes 
of the 'productivity policies' themselves. It is not the 'demonstrative 
firms' that should be referred to, but those firms, public and private, that 
had managed to combine a strategy increasingly oriented to expanding the 
internal market and mass consumption with a personnel policy going beyond 
the 'suggestion box' and the introduction of the 'factory chaplain' (60). It 
was the company reformism in the ENI or IRI group firms - not to mention the 
Olivetti 'factory community' - involving job evaluation and Christmas gift 
packs, staff attitude selection and holiday camps, productivity bonuses and 
house journals (61). Faced with all this, the union was often disarmed; just 




























































































widespread mobilization of technical staff achieved, essentially at its 
expense, through the US initiative.
The ECA and MSA continually drew attention to the need to privilege 
these groups as the 'mediator' par excellence of the technical and political 
message going out to the firm.
The composition of the National Productivity Committee (of its subcom­
mittees and work groups), of the peripheral centres and plant productivity 
groups always stressed technical 'capacities'. It is to these, more than to 
workers or employers, that the NPC's own publicity ends up being addressed, 
like that of the other institutes for applied research on company training. 
One example out of many is the review 'Produttività', which after its first 
five years of life had 61% of readership in middle and top management of 
industrial firms; in Lombardy and Piedmont, 50% of subscribers (62).
Let us now consider the individual initiatives from this particular 
point of view. For instance, the spread of training through adaptation of 
the TWI (training within industry) method is known to have been aimed 
principally at creating a new type of foreman. The American 'foreman' was to 
be given a not merely professional but also cultural counterpart. The 
mediator of the relationship between trade and management was no longer the 
'master craftsman' selected among the workers for seniority and experience 
and legitimized in their eyes thereby, but the recently graduated tech­
nician, trained in the company schools and otherwise subject to the firm's 
hierarchies (63).
Involvement of middle management was pursued systematically: the tech­
nical assistance missions to the US had many participants called 
'technicians', as being those entrusted the key role of daily adaptation of 




























































































On this aspect, the ECA and NPC secured a success that is still more 
striking when one considers the failure met with by each of the endeavours 
to mobilize intellectuals in favour of the Marshall Plan.
To give one example, the ERP Propaganda Committee had organized mee­
tings and events that met no response by comparison with the enormous 
cultural mobilization achieved by the left in the years of the Labour Plan, 
the reconstruction of the South and - why not? - the defence of the Italian 
cinema from US cultural imperialism. The 'liberty bell' or the competition 
for an ERP poster were poor stuff in comparison. By contrast, the produc­
tivity campaign, in years of relative decline of the left's cultural 
initiative, mobilized new and broader intellectual strata. Moving directly 
from their place in the productive process, it utilized their centrality in 
the process of modernization and democratic stabilization of the country 
(64).
Modernization and democratic stabilization were the ultimate objectives 
of the politics of productivity. Attracted by this combination, intellec­
tuals and technicians, trade unionists and employers interpreted the 
productivity campaign quite diversely, sometimes minimizing it and sometimes 
in full convergence with the US plan. To that extent, Italy was no different 
from other European countries. Instead, it showed marked national 
peculiarities in the type of impact that these interpretations (and result­
ing initiatives) had on society. Even on the eve of the 'miracle' which was 
to change the face of the country and the weight of the prevailing 
ideologies, all the protagonists ended up dissatisfied with the years of the 
productivity drive.
The seed had been sown, but modernization, while certainly under way, 




























































































recalled the Italian 1920s. The differences were of course plain, but in no 
way reassuring. Now it was not Fascist repression but 'market laws' that 
guaranteed the virtuous spiral of low wages - exports - accumulation. The 
real novelty by comparison with the past, the consolidation of democracy and 
respect for civil liberties, was paradoxically entrusted - in the darkest 
years of centrism - to the objective role of those opposition forces long 
portrayed as destabilisatory.
Those were two things to think about. Perhaps all this is why the 
petering out of the productivity campaign left none to bewail it, on either 
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